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of dissatisfaction with the remedial methods of the states for enforcing the right of privacy. Rather it is to impose upon the
states a procedure which to a greater extent should prevent the
breach of the right in the first place.
It is this interest in
preventing the breach of the right rather than giving a sufficient
remedy that is at the heart of this decision. The majority may
well be correct in concluding that unless the breach of the right
of privacy can be prevented, then the right itself is a nullity.
It will be for future cases to decide whether the totality of
federal case law on the exclusionary rule will also apply to the
states. Several of the states which had accepted the rule prior
to the instant case had exceptions to its application.35 The effect
of this decision on such state law is doubtful, but it would seem
that, rather than apply the totality of federal law. the Court will
decide each case in relationship to the test applied in the instant
case-does it conform to the requirements of due process.

)X
CRIMINAL LAW--APPEALS-POOR PERSON'S APPEAL FROM
DENIAL OF HABEAS CORPUS REFUSED WHERE ISSUES HAD PRIOR
ADEQUATE REVIE.-Defendant filed notice of appeal from the

county court's denial of his writ of habeas corpus but took no
further steps to perfect it, instead appealing from the conviction
to the Appellate Division and attacking the judgment on the same
grounds he had relied upon in the habeas corpus proceeding. The
conviction was affirmed by both the Appellate Division and the
Court of Appeals. Defendant then moved for leave to have appeal
from the habeas corpus denial heard as a "poor person." The
motion was denied, and the appeal dismissed. From this dismissal
defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals which held that where
it appears from either the moving papers or the court's own
records that the question sought to he reviewed in a post-conviction
hearing has already been passed upon, the indigent defendant may
not prosecute the appeal at public expense, "adequate appellate
review" having been granted. People v. Martin, 9 N.Y.2d 351,
174 N.E.2d 475, 214 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1961).
"[A] State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide
appellate courts or a right to appellate review," 1 but if provided,
35For example, South Dakota and Wisconsin refuse to supress evidence
because of technical irregularities in the search warrant. S.D. CoDE § 34.1102
(Supp. 1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. §963.08 (1958).
1 Griffin

v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
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these must be made available to all. Thus, the United States
Supreme Court, in the well noted 2 case of Griffin v. Illinois,3
held that "destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate
appellate review as defendants who have money. . .. ,,4 The
In
difficulty arises in delimiting "adequate appellate review."
Griffin the adequacy test was fulfilled upon the court order that
the indigent be granted a trial transcript gratis. The court, however, noted that granting a trial transcript need not be the sole
means of achieving this, and left open the door for courts to
"find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate
review to indigent defendants. . .." 5
Prior to the Griffin decision, the New York statute,6 which
granted an indigent defendant the right to a free trial transcript in
capital cases where, upon the defendant's conviction, the sentence
7
was death or life imprisonment, had been strictly construed. However, interpreting the Griffin decision as a mandate to grant free
transcripts in every instance, two lower court decisions extended
this right to non-capital cases.8 One of these decisions was
quickly reversed 9 and the other disapproved, 10 solidifying the
former and present position that no authority exists in New York
to grant an indigent defendant a trial transcript gratis except in
Thus the New York
a proceeding involving a capital crime."
law concerning the right of an indigent defendant evolved because
of Ithe Griffin requirement of "adequate appellate review," and
the disability of the New York courts to effectuate it through
the means of a free trial transcript in non-capital cases.
In People v. Kalan,2 the New York Court of Appeals held
that the failure to appoint appeal counsel when the defendant
lacked the financial means to acquire the record or employ counsel
2See, e.g., Comment, 55 MIcH. L. REv. 413 (1957);
U. CHi. L. REv. 143 (1957); 59 W. VA. L. REv. 79 (1957).
3351
U.S. 12 (1956).
4
5

Comment, 25

1d. at 19.
d. at 20.

6 N.Y. CODE CRim. PROC. §§ 308, 485. For a listing of other jurisdictions
with similar provisions see Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 161 (1957).

See also 3 N.Y.L.F. 317 (1957).
7People v. Raymondi, 180 Misc. 973, 43 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Kings County
Ct. 1943), appeal dismissed, 268 App. Div. 863, 50 N.Y.S.2d 678 (2d Dep't

1944).

SPeople v. Strong, 159 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Kings County Ct. 1956); People
v. Jackson, 2 Misc. 2d 521, 152 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Herkimer County Ct. 1956).
OPeople v. Strong, 4 Misc. 2d 748, 159 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Kings County Ct.

1957).
2oPeople v. Brown, 3 App. Div. 2d 696, 158 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (4th Dep't
1957)

(per curiam).

2People v. Pitts, 6 N.Y.2d 288, 160 N.E.2d 523, 189 N.Y.S.2d 650
(1959).
22 N.Y.2d 278, 140 N.E.2d 357, 159 N.Y.S.2d 480

(1957)

(per curiam).
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prevented "an effective use of the right to appeal in violation
of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection." 13 However, as in Griffin, the door was left open for
the court to discover other means sufficient to assure the in-4
digent an effective right to appeal. Thus, in People v. Breslin,'
where the defendant did possess a copy of the trial transcript,
it was held unnecessary to appoint counsel, for his possession
of the record insured him the means to "adequate appellate
review." '5 People v. Pitts 16 further clarified the New York
position that when the right to appeal exists, the indigent defendant
must be granted effective and adequate means to perfect that
right. Such means could take the form of a trial transcript, or
the appointment of counsel, these, however, not being exclusive
of any other adequate means that might be discovered.
In People v. Wilson," a new question was presented: an
indigent's rights on appeal from denial of a writ of error coram
nobis.' s Defendant sought to appeal on typewritten briefs as a
poor person from the county court's denial of the writ. Upon
the district attorney's assertion of lack of substantial merit to
the appeal, the right to appeal as a poor person was denied by
the Appellate Division and the appeal dismissed "upon the ground
that no record [had] been filed and there was no appearance for
the [defendant]." '9 The Court of Appeals found this denial
to be error relying upon Section 517 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which affords the right to appeal not only from a
conviction, but also from a denial of a writ of error coram nobis.
The indigent defendant must be granted an "adequate appellate

'3 Id. at 280, 140 N.E.2d at 358, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
The constitution
there referred to is the New York constitution, not the federal constitution.
See N.Y. CoNsT. art I, §§ 6, 11.
144 N.Y.2d 73, 149 N.E.2d 85, 172 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1958).
's The court carefully distinguished the Griffin and Kalan decisions, stating
that in those cases, defendants "did not have transcripts -of the trial proceedings, which precluded them from obtaining adequate appellate review.
." Id. at 77, 149 N.E.2d at 87, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 160. The dissent failed
"to perceive how an imprisoned defendant's possession of a copy of the
minutes . . . [rendered] use of his right to appeal a whit more effective."
Id. at 81, 149 N.E.2d at 89, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 164. The two opinions thus
sharply disagreed on what constitutes "adequate appellate review," for the
dissent maintains that any effective presentation demands the aid of a lawyer.
16 See note 11 supra.
177 N.Y.2d 568, 166 N.E.2d 838, 200 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1960).
1s The prior cases of Kalan, Breslin, and Pitts each involved the denial
of counsel upon a direct appeal from conviction.
19 People v. Wilson, 7 N.Y2d 568, 570, 166 N.E.2d 838, 839, 200 N.Y.S.2d
40, 41 (1960). It is important that the right to appeal remained open to
the defendant, for he need merely file the record or make an appearance
to have it entertained. What was denied him, however, was the means to do
either of the two.
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review" in both instances. Thus, in an appeal from a denial of
a writ of error coram nobis, as in a direct appeal from a
conviction, the indigent defendant must be granted "the means
(e.g. a record or attorney) necessary to present the case to an
appellate court." 20 In People v. Borum, 21 the court added that
this right "does not depend upon . . . meritorious points, [and

thus an appellate court] may not insist upon an indigent defendant
showing substantial merit before entertaining his appeal.

22

In

summary, the right to appeal being granted by section 517, it is
the duty of the courts to assure the indigent defendant the means
with which to render this appeal effective and adequate, without
regard to the merits of his case.
The principal case involves an appeal from a denial of a
writ of habeas corpus. The defendant sought to prosecute this
appeal as a poor person, asserting his inability to otherwise achieve
an effective appellate review. The Appellate Division denied the
request and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The basis of this
decision is not clear, the Court apparently utilizing alternate
theories.
The arguments presently urged in the habeas corpus appeal
had been previously rejected by the New York courts on the
appeal from his conviction. Throughout these proceedings counsel
or permission to employ typewritten briefs as a poor person had
been granted. The court, in the light of this, felt the Griffin
requirement of "adequate appellate review" had been complied
with.2 3 The rationale behind this holding would appear to be
that although the requirements were not, in a strict sense, complied with in the present appeal, they had been complied with
in the previous direct appeal from conviction wherein counsel was
granted. Since identical issues and arguments were presented in
the prior appeal as are here presented, the adequate appellate
review therein granted in effect "carries over" to the habeas corpus
appeal, fulfilling
the state's obligations and the constitutional
24
guarantees.
However, there are also in the opinion indications that the
Appellate Division's dismissal of the appeal is being affirmed on
the basis of a lack of substantial merit to the appeal. The
defendant urges that "the court should have applied the principle
20

1d. at 571, 166 N.E2d at 840, 200 N.Y.S2d at 42.

218 N.Y.2d 177, 168 N.E.2d
22
1d. at 178, 168 N.E.2d at

527, 203 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1960).
528, 203 N.Y.S2d at 85.
23 Using the language employed in Griffin, the court said "this indigent
appellant has already received 'as adequate appellate review as defendants

who have money enough to buy transcripts."' People v. Martin, 9 N.Y.2d
351, 354, 174 N.E.2d 475, 477, 214 N.Y.S.2d 370, 373 (1961).
24 "Due process and equal protection impose no obligation on the State
to accord a purposeless activity a constitutionally protected status." Ibid.
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. . . in post-conviction proceedings coram nobis to the effect that

an indigent defendant is not required to show substantial merit
before his appeal may be entertained." 22 The dissent urges that
indigent defendants must be given the same rights as more financially able defendants, and relies on the coram nobis Borumn
26
decision to the effect that substantial merit need not be shown.
Both disregard the fact that they are confronted with an appeal
from habeas corpus, and not from coram nobis. As stated in
People v. Murphy,2 7 "the rule requiring us to grant leave to all
indigent defendants to appeal on typewritten papers in coram
nobis proceedings, without regard to the merit of the appeal does
not extend to appeals in habeas corpus proceedings." 28 The court
reasoned that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding governed by
the Civil Practice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, which
require a showing of substantial merit before a defendant is allowed
to prosecute an appeal as a poor person.2 9 The majority opinion recognizes this distinction 30 without expressly relying on it. However,
the language employed does indicate the use of a substantial merit
test.
If, in fact, the Court was distinguishing the present habeas
corpus proceeding from those involving direct or coram nobis
appeals, thereby justifying the application of a substantial merit
test as set out in the Rules of Civil Practice,' a good deal more
clarity than was utilized would have been appropriate. The "carry
over" adequate appellate review theory would appear to have
validity and be applicable not only in habeas corpus appeals,
but also in coram nobis and direct appeals. However, in the
latter two instances, a "substantial merit" theory may not be
utilized in view of the precedents from Griffin to Borum, which
grant the right to an adequate and effective appeal without a
showing of merit. The danger lies in the thin line separating the
"carry over" and "substantial merit" theories and the ease with
which the two could become one. 2 The possibility of that oc-

25

Id. at 354, 174 N.E.2d at 476, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 372.
at 355, 174 N.E.2d at 477, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
11 App. Div. 2d 1095, 206 N.Y.S.2d 484 (4th Dep't 1960) (memorandum

26id.
27

decision).
2

81d. at 1095, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85.

29

See also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr
Id. at 1096, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
§ 196; N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 35-36.
30 "[Defendant] made a cross motion for an order to have his appeal
heard as a 'poor person' . . . without, however, certifying that a good cause
existed." People v. Martin, supra note 23, at 353-54, 174 N.E2d at 476,
214 N.Y.S.2d at 372. (Emphasis added.)
31 See N.Y.R. Civ. PRAc. 35-36.
22 Here, the adequate appellate review is carried over because the identical
question was previously presented and dealt with. A court would need little
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currence is enhanced when, as here, the two are used conjunctively, without clear distinction.

X0
INTERNATIONAL LAW-FOREIGN DECREE MAY BE EXAMINED
LAw.-Farr, Whitlock & Co. contracted
to purchase sugar from a wholly-owned Cuban corporate subsidiary
of Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey [hereinafter referred
to as C.A.V.], an American owned corporation incorporated
in Cuba. Payment was to be made in New York upon the
presentation of the necessary shipping documents.
Before the
loading of the sugar could be completed at the Cuban port of
Jucaro, the Cuban government nationalized the property of C.A.V.
In order to obtain the sugar, Farr, Whitlock & Co. subsequently
entered into a new agreement with plaintiff's assignor, a governmentowned corporation, containing the same terms as the original contract of sale. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 977-b of the New
York Civil Practice Act,' the New York State Supreme Court
appointed a temporary receiver for the New York assets of C.A.V.,
to whom Farr, Whitlock & Co. was directed to pay the proceeds
of the sale. Plaintiff, a financial agent of the Cuban government.
basing its claim upon the second agreement, sued in federal court
to recover the sales proceeds either from Farr, Whitlock & Co.
or from the receiver. The District Court, in dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, held it could refuse to enforce a foreign nationalization
decree which was in violation of international law. Banco Nacional
De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Prior to the instant decision, it was a well-established principle
that the courts of this country would refuse to question the validily,
of an act of a foreign sovereign having intraterritorial effect. 2
UNDER INTERNATIONAL

ingenuity to carry over the previous adequate review when a mb.stantally
identical question had been previously reviewed.
1This section provides for the appointment of a receiver to liquidate
New York assets of a foreign corporation which has been dissolved, liquidated, nationalized or has ceased to do business by revocation or annulment
of its organic law or by dissolution or otherwise.
2See RE, FORMGN CoNriscATIoNs 58 (1951).
The "Act of State!'
doctrine, while precluding the courts of the forum from reviewing the
legislative and executive acts of the foreign state, does not preclude the
review of "judicial proceedings of a foreign court resulting in a judgment
if enforcement is sought in the courts of the forum." Id. at 59. Although
foreign judgments are usually enforced on the basis of comity, courts have
refused to give effect to them where they were violative of the public
policy of the forum. Moreover, "foreign judgments . . . have been

